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RACIAL EQUALITY IN JURY SELECTION
F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Judge Robert Bell is so well known for his groundbreaking
efforts in support of access to justice programs—whether through
expanding lawyer assistance opportunities or creating problemsolving courts—that his other significant legal accomplishments are
often overlooked. The quest for racial equality in jury selection is one
aspect in which Chief Judge Bell’s contributions have made an
important and long-lasting impression. Chief Judge Bell has written
eight precedent-setting opinions examining peremptory challenges
1
and voir dire claims under federal and state law. His body of
2
material goes from his powerful reasoning in Hill v. State, where, in
response to the trial court’s refusal to include the defendant’s request
for a racial bias question in the jury’s voir dire, he wrote that “[n]o
surer way could be devised to bring the process of justice into
3
4
disrepute,” to his principled dissent from a decision he viewed as
5
erroneously applying the rule in Batson v. Kentucky, which governs
how to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in
jury selection.
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1. The following cases involved peremptory challenges: Richardson v. State, 381 Md.
348, 849 A.2d 487 (2004); Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 762 A.2d 48 (2000);
Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 665 A.2d 223 (1995); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 682 A.2d
248 (1996); Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992); State v. Gorman, 324 Md.
124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991). The following cases involved voir dire: Bowie v. State, 324 Md.
1, 595 A.2d 448 (1995); Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995).
2. 339 Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995).
3. Id. at 284, 661 A.2d at 1169 (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308
(1931)).
4. State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 132, 596 A.2d 629, 633 (1991).
5. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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II. CHIEF JUDGE BELL’S JURISPRUDENCE ON RACE AND JURY SELECTION
In Hill v. State, a black defendant was arrested by a white police
officer for possession of cocaine. 6 At trial, the defendant requested
that the court include a racial bias question in the jury’s voir dire.
The trial court refused, although it asked the usual questions about
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. On appeal, the issue was
whether the trial court correctly refused to voir dire the jury about
racial bias. The opinion, authored by Chief Judge Bell, found that a
voir dire into racial bias is appropriate even if the case does not
involve interracial violence. In so finding, Chief Judge Bell explained
the court’s reasoning: “We think that it would be far more injurious to
permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying
prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed
7
to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred.”
8
In Mejia v. State, a Hispanic defendant was charged with rape
and related sexual offenses. At trial, pursuant to the rule in Batson,
the state used a peremptory challenge to exclude a jury member that
the defendant alleged to be Hispanic. The court overruled the
defendant’s objection and trial proceeded, resulting in the
defendant’s conviction. The defendant appealed, alleging that when
he objected to the peremptory challenge, he presented a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination to which the state was required to
respond. The Court of Special Appeals held that the defendant failed
to present a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and that
“[a] proffer, even when neither contradicted nor challenged by the
9
[state] or the court, [was] not sufficient.” On appeal, the issue was
whether the defendant’s objection established a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination requiring a response by the state.
The opinion, authored by Chief Judge Bell, noted that to prove
purposeful discrimination the defendant must have shown that he was
a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the state had
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a member of the
defendant’s group. The Court of Appeals determined that group
membership could be assumed by observations and if the assumption
goes unchallenged, the defendant need not offer additional evidence.
The court ultimately concluded that the state did not respond to the
defendant’s assertion and that the record demonstrated that there
6.
7.
8.
9.

Hill, 339 Md. at 277, 661 A.2d at 1165.
Id. at 284, 661 A.2d at 1169.
328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992).
Id. at 532, 616 A.2d at 361.
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was only one person of Hispanic background in the venire and that
person was struck by the state. On these facts, the Court of Appeals
held that the defendant had established a prima facie case of
discrimination, which required a response from the state. In so
holding, Chief Judge Bell explained the court’s reasoning:
[W]hen the State uses peremptories in a manner that
assures that no [members of a cognizable group] will serve
on a jury that is to try a [member of that cognizable group],
it is at least permissible to conclude that a prima facie case of
discrimination has been made out. In that circumstance, it
is the effect of the use of the peremptories—exclusion of all
Hispanics from the venire—not what was said or asked
10
during voir dire, that is dispositive.
11
In State v. Gorman, the defendant was a black male who was
charged with armed robbery and a handgun violation. During voir
dire, the state excluded two black jurors in the jury pool through
peremptory challenges. The two excluded black jurors were the only
blacks in the jury pool. The state argued that the challenges were
discretionary ones falling outside of Batson’s coverage, and did not
require explanation.
After the defendant’s conviction and various appeals, the
Supreme Court of the United States vacated the conviction and
remanded the proceedings to the Court of Special Appeals on the
12
issue of peremptory challenges applied to black venire members.
After several further appeals, the Court of Appeals held that the
defendant could not challenge the use of peremptory challenges
13
Upon further appeal, the
against black members of the venire.
Supreme Court again vacated the Court of Appeals decision and
14
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.
On further consideration, the state conceded that the
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges against the only two black
venire members established a prima facie case of discrimination, and
that the burden had shifted to the prosecution to demonstrate a race15
neutral reason for those challenges. On this appeal, the issue was
whether the case should be remanded to the trial court so that the

10. Id. at 539, 616 A.2d at 355 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987)).
11. 324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991).
12. Gorman v. Maryland, 480 U.S. 913 (1987).
13. State v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203 (1991).
14. Gorman v. Maryland, 499 U.S. 971 (1991).
15. State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991).
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prosecution could offer race-neutral reasons for exercising
16
peremptory challenges, or whether a new trial should be granted.
The majority reasoned that, under Batson, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to permit the prosecutor an opportunity
to demonstrate race-neutral explanations for his peremptory
17
challenges. Such remand could occur even though the prosecutor
declined to provide such explanations during the trial and that six
years had passed since jury selection concluded. In the view of the
majority, the remand was appropriate because a reasonable possibility
existed that the prosecutor could reconstruct his reasoning from the
original jury list and notes, and because the trial judge had the
discretion to order a new trial if the prosecutor could not
demonstrate a race-neutral motivation.
In dissent, Chief Judge Bell concluded that the majority of the
18
Court of Appeals erred in not ordering a new trial. Chief Judge Bell
reasoned that remanding the case back to the trial court and
affording the state an opportunity to supply race-neutral reasons for
the peremptory challenges was problematic because the defendant’s
counsel gave no indication as to the availability of his records or his
ability to recall information that could challenge explanations that
may be given by the state, and a remand would permit the great
potential for abuse and an opportunity to construct false race-neutral
justifications. Explaining his reasoning, Chief Judge Bell stated:
In resolving this issue, the critical consideration is fairness,
which at bottom is reflected in, and adds to, the integrity of
the system. When the State is not afforded an opportunity,
at the trial level, to respond to defense charges, it would be
unfair not to allow it to do so after an appellate processing
has found those charges sufficient, prima facie, to require a
response. On the other hand, given the potential for abuse,
the integrity of the process may be compromised when the
State is given another opportunity to respond,
notwithstanding its refusal to respond on the first occasion.
That is especially the case when it is that initial refusal that
caused the trial record deficiency on that critical point in
the first place. In my opinion, therefore, there is a need for
a bright line minimum requirement, which, if it does not
exist, will preclude a limited remand. I would require, as a
minimum, that the record of the proceedings reflect either
that the State was not given the opportunity to respond to the
16. Id. at 129, 596 A.2d at 631.
17. Id. at 132, 596 A.2d at 633.
18. Id. at 138, 596 A.2d at 635.
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defendant’s allegations or some indication that the State
had an articulable basis for the strikes it made. 19
III. CONCLUSION
Chief Judge Bell’s writings on the subject of racial equality in jury
selection depict a keen understanding of the need to protect
individuals against racial discrimination, especially in the
administration of justice; an awareness of the harm to those
individuals and to society emanating from a failure to prevent such
discrimination or the appearance of discrimination; and a sensitivity
to principles of fairness and equity and how those principles have
been skewed by historical racial imbalance. While Chief Judge Bell’s
personal experience at an early age with racism was, no doubt, a
constant reminder of the need for careful examination of
discrimination claims and the imposition of the strongest protections
against such harmful treatment, his belief in enhancing justice by
improving our laws could only have come from a deep sense of moral
commitment to the rule of law and the highest regard for our
constitutional democracy.
One of Chief Judge Bell’s heroes, Baltimore-born Justice
Thurgood Marshall, who represented a teenage Bell before the
20
Supreme Court in 1960, was indeed smiling on those days when Bell
made his pronouncements. In Batson, the famous 1986 Supreme
Court decision prohibiting the removal by peremptory challenge of
all black persons from the venire without explanations, Justice
Marshall worried in his concurring opinion that the remedy the
majority was providing would be inadequate to prevent racial
discrimination and the perception of bias in the administration of
justice. Justice Marshall explained:
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court’s conclusion that use
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries,
on the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection
Clause. I would go further, however, in fashioning a remedy
adequate to eliminate that discrimination. Merely allowing
defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual
cases will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory
21
challenge.
19. Id. at 137–38, 596 A.2d at 635.
20. CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993).
21. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986).
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As the only Justice that had actually litigated a capital murder
22
23
case, and as the most experienced litigator on the Court, Justice
Marshall knew better than most other Justices the prosecutorial
historical record. Unfortunately, that record included the exclusion
of blacks so that very few ended up actually serving as jurors.
In his opinions in Hill and Mejia and his dissent in Gorman, Chief
Judge Bell helped his hero Justice Marshall provide a “more adequate
remedy” against racial discrimination in jury selection. From a
concern for preventing the appearance of bias in the administration
of justice, as well as actual discrimination in such proceedings,
through a meticulous protection of defendant’s rights against
discrimination in jury selection through careful application of
Batson’s peremptory challenge restrictions, to a keen understanding
of the harmful realities of discrimination and the need to provide
strong protections against it, Chief Judge Bell significantly improved
racial justice in judicial proceedings. For that contribution, all
Americans owe Chief Judge Bell a debt of gratitude.

22. F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS 593
(3d ed. 2010).
23. Id.

